

CUMMINGS, who introduced a House companion bill today.

This bipartisan, common-sense bill fixes a loophole in Federal law used by for-profit medical schools in the Caribbean to gain access to Federal education dollars without meeting the same requirements as other foreign medical schools.

Under current law, a small number of medical schools—about six, four of which are for-profits—are exempt from meeting the same requirements to qualify for Title IV funding that all other medical schools outside of the U.S. and Canada must meet.

This loophole allows these schools to enroll large percentages of American students—which means access to more federal dollars.

The biggest of these schools are for-profits—St. George's, Ross, and American University of the Caribbean whose enrollments of Americans are 91 percent, 83 percent, and 86 percent respectively. Other schools are prohibited from having U.S. citizens or U.S. permanent residents make up more than 40 percent of enrollment.

These for-profit schools have turned the idea of being a foreign school on its head—they are located outside of the U.S., but have majority-American enrollments.

They don't have to meet the same high standards U.S. medical schools must meet, but also don't have to meet the same requirements as schools located outside of the U.S. to access hundreds of millions of dollars of federal funding. It's a pretty good deal for them.

In fact in 2012, the three schools I mentioned earlier—St. George's and Ross and American University of the Caribbean, both owned by DeVry, took in more than \$450 million from the federal government—from American taxpayers. That amounted to more than two-thirds of all Title IV funding that went to all foreign medical schools.

To sum up—three schools, 2/3 of the Federal funding, exempt from the law.

Not only are these three schools exempt from the enrollment requirement, but they don't have to meet a minimum standard of success—having 75 percent of their students pass the U.S. board exams—a requirement for any of its students to actually practice medicine in the United States.

The University of Sydney, with its dozen or so American students, has to meet this standard in order to receive Title IV dollars. But DeVry's Ross University, with 1,000 or more American students, does not.

It doesn't seem right to the Department of Education, which says there is no rationale for continuing the exemption. And it doesn't seem right to me either.

Especially when you consider what students are getting for this Federal investment—more debt, higher rates of attrition, and lower residency match rates than U.S. medical schools. Translation: More debt and less chance of becoming a doctor.

In September 2013, an article in Bloomberg by Janet Lorin entitled "DeVry Lures Medical School Rejects as Taxpayers Fund Debt" shined a bright light on the poor student outcomes of these schools.

It is no secret that for-profit foreign medical schools prey on students who have been rejected by traditional U.S. medical schools. They promise to fulfill the unrequited dreams for students who want to be doctors, but for one reason or another, did not make the cut in the U.S.

On average, scores on the MCAT, the test required to enter medical school, of students attending these offshore for-profit schools are lower than those of students who are admitted to medical schools in the U.S. In 2012, students at U.S. medical schools scored an average of 31 out of 45 on the MCAT while students at DeVry's Ross medical school scored an average of 24.

The attrition rate at U.S. medical schools averaged 3 percent for the class beginning in 2009 while rates at for-profit foreign medical schools can be up to 26 percent or higher. More than a quarter of the students at some of these schools drop out.

On average, students at for-profit medical schools operating outside of the United States and Canada amass more student debt than those at medical schools in the United States. For example, graduates of the American University of the Caribbean have a median of \$309,000 in Federal student debt versus \$180,000 for graduates of U.S. medical schools.

To add insult to injury, these foreign-trained graduates are on average less competitive candidates for coveted U.S. residency positions. In 2015, residency match rates for foreign-trained graduates averaged 53 percent compared to 94 percent for graduates of medical schools in the United States. They are even less likely to land a residency position the second time around.

According to the Bloomberg article I referenced earlier, one graduate of St. George's University, Michael Uva, amassed almost \$400,000 in medical school loans, but failed to land a residency spot twice. Michael was forced to work at a blood donation clinic earning \$30 an hour instead. Although he sacrificed years of his life training for it, without completing a residency, he will never get to practice medicine and this \$400,000 debt will likely follow him throughout his life.

Congress has failed taxpayers and students by subsidizing these Caribbean schools with billions in Federal dollars for years without adequate accountability and oversight.

This bill takes a first step at addressing that failure—by ensuring these Caribbean schools must meet the same standards other schools outside of the United States and Canada must meet.

This bill should send a message to those schools down in the sunny Caribbean who may have thought they could continue to exploit taxpayers and students without anybody noticing.

It has broad support among the U.S. medical school community—endorsed by medical school deans of more than 60 venerable U.S. medical schools and the American Association of Colleges of Osteopathic Medicine.

I look forward to working with Senator CASSIDY as well as Chairman ALEXANDER and Ranking Member MURRAY to address this issue as the HELP Committee begins consideration of the Higher Education Act.

#### USA PATRIOT ACT

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I wish to explain why I support a short-term reauthorization of the national security authorities that expire on June 1, and why I will not vote for cloture on the latest version of the USA FREEDOM Act at this time. These authorities need to be reauthorized and reformed in a way that appropriately balances national security with the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans. I am hopeful that during the next few weeks we can do a better job of doing just that.

I start with the premise that these are important national security tools that shouldn't be permitted to expire. If that were to happen, there is little doubt that the country would be placed at greater risk of terrorist attack, at a time when we can least afford it. This isn't exaggeration or hyperbole.

We have recently witnessed the emergence of ISIS, a terrorist organization that controls large swaths of Iraq and Syria, including, as of just days ago, the capital of the largest province in Iraq. ISIS is beheading Americans and burning its captives alive for propaganda value. And fueled in part by black market oil sales, ISIS reportedly has at least \$2 billion.

The organization isn't just sitting on that money. Members of ISIS and related groups are actively recruiting would-be terrorists from around the world to come to Syria. They are inspiring attacks, often using social media, in the West, from Paris, to Sydney, to Ottawa, and even here in the United States, in places like New York City, Ohio, and Garland, TX. Director Comey has reported that the FBI has investigations of perhaps thousands of people in various stages of radicalization in all 50 States.

So this isn't the time to let these various authorities expire. This isn't the time to terminate the government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance of so-called "lone wolf" terrorists—people who are inspired by groups like ISIS but don't have direct contact with them. And this isn't the time to end the government's ability to seek roving wiretaps against terrorists. After all, this is a tool that prosecutors have used in criminal investigations since the mid-1980s.

Most of all, this isn't the time to sunset the government's ability to acquire records from businesses like hotels, car rental agencies, and supply

companies, under section 215, in a targeted fashion. These kinds of records are routinely obtained by prosecutors in criminal investigations, though the use of grand jury subpoenas. It makes no sense for the government to be able to collect these records to investigate bank fraud, insider trading and public corruption, but not to help keep the country safe from terrorists.

While we must reauthorize these authorities, however, it is equally important that we reform them. But we don't yet have a reform bill that I am satisfied with.

The American people have made clear that they want the government to stop indiscriminately collecting their telephone metadata in bulk under section 215. They also want more transparency from the government and from the private sector about how section 215 and other national security authorities are being used. They want real reform.

I want to be clear that I emphatically agree with these goals. They can be achieved responsibly, and doing so will restore an important measure of trust in our intelligence community.

I agree with these reforms because the civil liberties implications of the collection of this type of bulk telephone metadata are concerning. This is especially so, given the scope and nature of the metadata collected through this program.

Now, there haven't been any cases of this metadata being intentionally abused for political or other ends. That is good. I recognize that the overwhelming majority of those who work in the intelligence community are law-abiding American heroes to whom we owe a great debt for helping to keep us safe.

But other national security authorities have been abused. Unfortunately, to paraphrase James Madison, all men aren't angels. I've been critical, for example, of the Department of Justice's handling of the so-called LOVEINT cases uncovered by the NSA's Inspector General.

Given human nature, then, the mere potential for abuse makes the status quo concerning the bulk collection of telephone metadata under section 215 unsustainable, especially when measured against the real yet modest intelligence value the program has provided.

The USA FREEDOM Act would in some ways reauthorize and reform section 215 along these lines. It would end the bulk collection of telephone metadata in 6 months, and transition the program to a system where the phone companies hold the data for targeted searching by the government.

But the bill's serious flaws cause me to believe that we can do better. Let me discuss just a few.

First, while the system to which the bill would transition the program sounds promising, it does not exist at present, and may well not exist in 6 months. Intelligence community lead-

ers don't know for sure how long it will take to build. They don't know for sure how fast it will be able to return search results to the government. They don't know for sure whether the phone companies will voluntarily keep the metadata for later searching by the government.

On this score, then, this bill feels like a leap into the dark when we can least afford it. While we need certainty that the bulk collection of telephone metadata under section 215 will end, we also need more certainty that the new system proposed will work and be effective.

Second, the bill contains reforms to the FISA Court that are unneeded and risky. I am strongly in favor of reforming the court to make clear that it can appoint a traditional amicus, or a friend of the court, to help it get the law right. This is a well understood legal concept.

But this bill goes further—potentially dangerously so. Under certain circumstances, the bill directs the FISA Court to name a panel of outside experts who would, in the words of the *New York Times*, “challenge the government's pleadings” before the court.

Especially when the bill already ends the kind of dragnet intelligence collection under section 215 that affects so many innocent Americans, this is wholly unnecessary. And for this reason, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts sent a letter alerting Congress to its concerns that this outside advocate could “impede the court's work” by delaying the process and chilling the government's candor.

In addition, this proposed advocate is contrary to our legal traditions, in which judges routinely make similar decisions on an ex parte basis, hearing only from the government. Mobsters don't get a public defender when the government seeks to wiretap their phones. Crooked bankers don't get a public defender when the government seeks a search warrant for their offices. There is no need to give ISIS a public defender when the government seeks to spy on its terrorists to keep the country safe.

Third, the bill also contains language that amends the federal criminal code to implement a series of important and widely-supported treaties aimed at preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation. However, the bill doesn't authorize the death penalty for nuclear terrorists. Nor does it permit the government to request authorization from a judge to wiretap the telephones of these terrorists or allow those who provide them material support to be prosecuted. These common-sense provisions were requested by both the Bush and Obama Administrations, but for unknown reasons they were omitted from the bill.

In fact, Senator WHITEHOUSE and I have introduced separate legislation, the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2015, which would

implement these treaties with these provisions included.

Recently, I have been heartened that there is a bipartisan group of members of the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees who share these and other concerns. We have been discussing an alternative reform bill that would also end the bulk collection of telephone metadata under section 215. But it would also do a better job of ensuring that our national security is still protected.

So I support a short, temporary reauthorization with the hope that an alternative reform bill can be crafted that addresses the core reform goals of the American people and that appropriately balances national security with the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans. There is work ahead, but it is important that we get this reform right.

#### USA FREEDOM ACT

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the votes the Senate will soon take relating to three expiring provisions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

I will vote to support the USA FREEDOM Act, the bill passed by the House last week by a vote of 338 to 88, and strongly urge my colleagues to do the same. In my view, this is the only action that we can take right now that will prevent important intelligence authorities from expiring at the end of next week.

Let me describe the situation in a little more detail.

On Monday morning at 12:01 a.m. on June 1, three separate sections of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, will expire. Two of those provisions were first added to FISA in 2001 in the USA PATRIOT Act, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11. They are the business records section, also known as section 215, and the roving wiretap provision.

The business records provision was originally intended to allow the government to go to the FISA Court to get an order to be able to obtain a variety of records relevant to an investigation. The authority was, and remains, very important for the FBI.

Since 2006, the business records authority in FISA has also been used by the NSA to get telephone metadata records from telephone companies—the records of the telephone numbers and the time and duration of a call. Metadata does not include the content or the location or names of the individuals on the phone.

The roving wiretap provision allows the government to use surveillance authorities under FISA, pursuant to a court order, against an individual who seeks to evade surveillance by switching communication devices. If a terrorist gets a new cell phone or changes an email address, the government can continue surveillance on that individual under the same probable cause